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Introduction
In democratic societies public decisions should reflect the will of citizens. Elections allow voters to choose their representatives, i.e. those who have the power to take public decisions. Therefore, the citizens' decision of whether to vote or not has political and economic consequences. For several decades, many scholars have studied the determinants of voter participation. There is now an extensive and fast-growing literature on voter turnout, which covers a wide variety of its potential socio-economic, political and institutional determinants (see Cancela and Geys, 2016) . However, quite surprisingly, this huge literature has devoted almost no attention to the effects that term limits may have on voter participation.
The main purpose of the present study is to help fill this gap in the literature by studying the impact of term limits on voter turnout, using the Portuguese case as a natural experiment. A law approved in 2005 stipulates that mayors and parish presidents cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same municipality/parish. This law became binding in the 2013 local elections, preventing 52% of the mayors and 29%
of the parish presidents from running for reelection. This led to a significant turnover of local candidates, which may have affected voter turnout.
Term limits have existed for a long time at the presidential level in countries such as the United States. More recently, mainly since the late 1980s, several American states also imposed term limits to governors and legislators. Countries such as Brazil, Italy and, subsequently Portugal, introduced term limits at the municipal level. There is a growing literature studying a wide range of potential effects of term limits on matters such as public policy, 3 electoral competition and campaign finance (e.g., Ansolabehere and Snyder Jr., 2004; Hall, 2014; Masket and Lewis, 2007) , career decisions (e.g., Lazarus, 2006; Powell, 2000) , effort of legislators (Dal Bó and Rossi, 2011) , corruption (Ferraz and Finan, 2011) , pork-barrel (Aidt and Shvets, 2012; Bernhardt et al., 2004) , political budget cycles (Klein and Sakurai, 2015; List and Sturm, 2006; Veiga and Veiga, 2016) , and many others (see 3 See, among others, Alt et al. (2011) , Case (1995, 2003) , Cummins (2012) , Keele et al. (2013) , Lewis (2012) , and Veiga and Veiga (2016) .
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Mooney 2009 for a survey). But, to the best of our knowledge, there is only one study focusing directly on the effect of term limits on voter turnout. Nalder (2007) We believe that our research on the Portuguese natural experiment can move forward the literature on this topic in several ways. First, the introduction of term limits at the local level provides a unique opportunity to analyze the consequences of this institutional reform on voter turnout. We do it by applying a difference-in-differences approach to panel datasets comprising all 308 Portuguese municipalities and 2,163 parishes. Second, the aftermath of term limits have, so far, been studied only for California. Other states'
and countries' experiences, especially at the local/municipal level, may provide useful insights for countries with similar institutional systems. Third, while in the US the states decide on the adoption of term limits, and term-limit laws vary from state to state, in Portugal the institutional reform was exogenously imposed by the national parliament, and the same law applies to all local governments, rendering the estimation of the termlimit treatment effect less problematic than when cross-state or cross-country datasets are 4 Also focusing on California, but using a survey of cities, Hajnal and Lewis (2003) The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the literature on voter participation, and discusses arguments for why the introduction of term limits might affect turnout. Section 3 describes the Portuguese local governments institutional setting.
The data and the difference-in-differences econometric models are described in Section 4.
Section 5 reports and comments the econometric results, and Section 6 concludes.
Voter participation and term limits
A fundamental question in democratic societies is why people vote at all. According to rational choice theory, the decision of whether to vote depends on the benefits and costs individuals expect to derive from the act of voting. The benefits depend on the expected utility of electing the preferred candidate and on the probability that the vote is pivotal. However, since the latter is usually very small and easily outweighed by the trouble of going to the voting station, the expected payoff of voting is nearly zero (Downs, 1957; Owen and Grofman, 1984 ). Yet, many people actually vote, which is known as the paradox of voting (Fiorina, 1976; Grofman, 1993) .
Theories to explain observed participation levels at elections can be grouped into five groups (Dhillon and Peralta, 2002) : 5 instrumental, expressive, boundedly rational voter, group based, and information-based. Instrumental theories presume that individuals vote because they care mainly about the consequences of the electoral process, including the need to avoid the collapse of democracy (Downs, 1957) . Under this assumption, when elections are close races the payoffs of voting increase because the probability of a single vote being pivotal is higher, which leads to higher turnout (Downs, 1957; Riker and Ordeshook, 1968) . Expressive theories suggest that people derive utility from expressing 5 See also the surveys of Blais (2006) and Geys (2006b) .
4 their attitudes when voting, and the utility from voting may increase from bandwagon effects in elections (Fiorina, 1976; Schuessler, 2000; Hamlin and Jennings, 2011; Brennan and Brooks, 2013; Blais and Galais, 2016) . Boundedly rational voter theories weaken the assumption of full rationality of voters, while group based theories explore the coordination mechanisms between members of a group of voters (namely, parties) that may increase the likelihood of determining the outcome of the election. Finally, the last group of theories highlights the importance of information on the decision of whether to vote or not. It argues that less informed voters may be better off delegating their decision to informed voters Pesendorfer, 1996, 1999; Matsusaka, 1995) .
Since the 1960s, numerous studies have analyzed empirically the determinants of voter turnout. 6 The explanatory variables used in turnout studies are generally grouped into three main categories: socio-economic, political, and institutional (Geys, 2006a; Cancela and Geys, 2016) . Regarding socio-economic variables, population size, concentration, and proportion of minorities are generally found to have negative effects on turnout, while population stability, income and ethnic homogeneity, education, and past turnout have positive effects. As for political variables, close elections, campaign expenditures, and higher political fragmentation are found to promote turnout. Institutional variables are arguably the most powerful determinants of turnout (Jackman, 1987; Franklin, 1996) .
Proportional electoral systems seem to increase turnout relative majoritarian/plurality systems (Blais and Aarts, 2006) . Additionally, compulsory voting and concurrent elections generally promote turnout, while more stringent registration requirements tend to decrease it (Garmann, 2016; Jaitman, 2013) . Taking advantage of a larger sample of studies, Cancela and Geys (2016) separately analyze the determinants of turnout in national and subnational elections. They find that campaign expenditures, closeness of elections and registration requirements have greater explanatory power in national election studies, while population size and composition, concurrent elections, and the electoral system are 6 A recent meta-analysis (Cancela and Geys, 2016) considers 185 studies of turnout using aggregatelevel data. This literature is not only numerous, but is also fast-growing, as a previous version of that meta-analysis (Geys, 2006a) included just 83 studies published between 1968 and 2004.
5 more important in subnational elections.
It is surprising that this huge literature on the determinants of voter turnout has almost ignored the potential effects of term limits, specially because some studies (Jackman, 1987; Franklin, 1996) We contribute to this scarce literature on the effects of term limits on voter turnout 7 Besides the normal interest that the institutional change generated in the media, the approval of the law introducing term limits led to a strong discussion on whether it prevented lame-ducks from running for mayor in other municipalities. The case was submitted to several court instances, with contradicting sentences. Only a few days before the election, did the constitutional court put an end to the argument by clarifying that the candidacy for mayor in other municipalities would be possible. Given that 52% of all mayors and 29% of the parish presidents could not run for reelection in the 2013 elections, this legislative reform led to a significant turnover of candidates and to many open races, whose result was more difficult to predict than if the incumbents could run for reelection (around 80% of the mayors were usually reelected in the previous elections). Increased competition and higher media coverage may have induced Portuguese voters to participate more in local elections. However, many voters may have felt frustrated for not being able to re-elect a term-limited incumbent, or for not knowing most of the candidates, and decided not to show up at the polls. Thus, the effect of the imposition of term limits at the local level in Portugal is a priori uncertain. 
Data and econometric models
Panel data models are estimated for the 308 Portuguese municipalities and for 2,163 parishes where term limits were applicable in 2013, covering the local elections of 1997, 10 The term limit counter was set back to zero for the presidents of the 2,078 parishes that were affected by the territorial reorganization of 2013, which imposed the amalgamation of several small parishes.
Thus, in the 2013 elections, binding term limits were only applicable in the 2,182 parishes whose territorial boundaries had remained exactly the same. These are the ones considered in the empirical analysis below, so that the comparison of turnout before and after the introduction of term limits is not influenced by the effects of territorial reorganization on voter participation. Due to missing values, a maximum of 2,163
parishes is considered in the regressions.
11 For previous studies of turnout in Portugal, see Freire and Magalhães (2002) , Freire et al. (2012) , Martins and Veiga (2013) , and Tavares and Carr (2013) . The DD framework requires that treated and control municipalities and parishes exhibit similar trends before term limits became binding (in the pre-treatment period of 1997 to 2009). Since we are not absolutely certain that the common trends hypothesis holds, 12 we control for region-specific trends in all regressions. According to Angrist and Pischke (2009, 238-241) , this allows treatment and control municipalities/parishes to follow different trends in a limited but potentially relevant way.
12 Appendix A shows the averages of the participation rates in treated and control municipalities (top graph) and parishes (lower graph) until 2009. The averages behave in a similar way, although the difference in participation rates between treated and control municipalities seems to increase slightly over time.
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The baseline DD model for municipalities can be summarized as follows:
(1) 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013 where T urnout it is the percentage of registered voters that turned out to vote 13 in the elections for the Town Council in municipality i in year t, T LM ayor it is a dummy variable that equals 1 in 2013 for the municipalities that had term-limited mayors in the term 2010-2013 (the treated group), and equals zero otherwise. The parameter δ measures the treatment effect, X it is a vector of control variables, µ i is the specific effect of municipality i, λ t are time effects (election dummies), θ i .t is a time trend for the NUTS III region 14 of municipality i, and ε it is the error term.
Since there are three concurrent local elections (Town Council, Municipal Assembly, and Parish Assembly), a voter's decision to participate in the elections for the Town Council may also be affected by whether her parish president is term-limited or not.
Thus, to account for this possibility, we include the Share of voters with term-limited parish president in the vector of control variables. Vector X also comprises a set of economic, socio-demographic and political control variables, listed in Table 1 , which have been found to affect voter participation in previous studies.
15
13 Although other turnout measures have been used in the literature (see Cancela and Geys, 2016) , this is the one that in the Portuguese context better measures the percentage of potential voters who actually
voted. An alternative definition is used in the robustness checks (Appendix B). 14 NUTS is the European Union nomenclature for territorial statistical units. Portugal is subdivided into three NUTS I regions (Mainland, Azores and Madeira), seven NUTS II regions, and 25 NUTS III regions. Each NUTS III region aggregates several municipalities, which correspond to the NUTS IV level.
Including municipal specific trends in equation (1) is a viable alternative, but it unnecessarily inflates the model with 307 trends and, as shown in Appendix B, the results remain essentially the same. 15 Several variables which were found to affect turnout, especially in cross-country studies, are not relevant for Portuguese municipal elections: (1) institutions and electoral rules are the same in all localities;
(2) there were never national, regional, or European concurrent elections; (3) ethnic homogeneity is quite high in Portugal, making the proportion of minorities a somewhat irrelevant issue, for which no data is available. There is no municipal data on campaign expenditures, and they are less relevant at the local level. Finally, data on income inequality is not available at the local level. Mayor's margin of victory (previous election) - Cancela and Geys (2016) Party similarity (mayor and prime minister) - Martins and Veiga (2013) Presence of independent lists + Martins and Veiga (2013) Average past vote share of left-wing parties - Lijphart (1997) Average past turnout + Cancela and Geys (2016) An extended version of the baseline DD model of equation (1) is applied at the parish level. The main differences are as follows. First, instead of the share of voters with term-limited parish president in a municipality, we include a dummy variable that equals one when the parish president is term-limited, and equals zero otherwise (T LP res it ).
Second, in order to account for a possible additional effect when both the mayor and the parish president are term-limited, an interaction variable is also included in the model (T LM ayor it * T LP res it ). Third, vector P it includes the control variables for which data at the parish level is available. Finally, control variables at the municipal level are considered
(2) 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013 Descriptive statistics of the above-described variables, for samples of 308 municipalities and 2,163 parishes are presented in Tables C.3 and C.4 of Appendix C.
We start by estimating the models of equations (1) and (2) by fixed effects, with robust standard errors clustered, respectively, by municipality and by parish.
17 After estimating a model with all explanatory variables described above, we check for eventual multicollinearity problems by analyzing variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the independent variables specified in our linear regression models. Then, after excluding the variables with the most problematic VIFs, we use the Akaike (AIC) and Schwartz (BIC) information criteria to select the most appropriate parsimonious model.
The fact that participation rates are bounded between zero and one implies that OLS (or fixed effects) may not be the most appropriate method to estimate the models of equations (1) and (2). Although a logistic transformation of the dependent variable (as proposed by Dubin and Kalsow, 1996) could be applied, so that it would no longer be bounded, predicted values from an OLS regression cannot be guaranteed to lie within the unit interval (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996) . In order to overcome these potential problems, we also estimate the models using two methods designed for fractional dependent variables: the fractional probit model, which allows for a dependent variable that is greater than or equal to zero and less than or equal to one; 18 and, the beta regression estimator (see Ferrari and Cribari-Neto, 2004) , which accommodates dependent variables that are greater than zero and less than one, which is the case of turnout rates in municipalities and parishes.
Empirical results
This section presents and describes the results of the estimation of the models of equations 1 and 2 for samples comprising 308 municipalities and 2,163 parishes, respectively.
In both cases, the local elections from 1997 to 2013 are considered. The results of a series of robustness tests are also briefly described.
Results for municipalities
The results of the estimation of the baseline model of equation (1), by fixed effects, are reported in the first column of Table C .3), the treatment effect is roughly 1.8%, which is relatively small, but by no means negligible.
There seems to be an additional effect on turnout when parish presidents are also termlimited. When the share of voters with term-limited parish presidents increases by one standard deviation, turnout increases by roughly 0.18 (=10.84*0.0165) percentage points.
These results for the effects of the imposition of term limits to Portuguese local governments are the opposite of those of Nalder (2007), who found evidence of a small negative effect of state legislative term limits in California. Therefore, contrary to her, we find 18 See Papke and Wooldridge (1996) for an application of fractional response regression to participation rates of employees in firms' retirement plans.
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evidence supporting the claims of term limits advocates that they promote voter participation.
Regarding the impact of economic variables, the unemployment rate and average real wages seem to have positive effects on turnout, while own revenues per capita are not statistically significant. The results for unemployment are consistent with Burden and Wichowsky (2014) and Charles and Stephens (2013) , who found evidence of a mobilization effect of economic hardship. 19 The positive effect of real wages supports our prior that poorer citizens are less likely to vote than wealthier ones (Kusara and Suryanarayan, 2015) .
Consistent with the results of previous studies (Blais, 2006; Martins and Veiga, 2013) , the share of the population over 65 years old and the presence of independent lists have positive effects on turnout, while population, absolute population growth (a proxy for demographic stability), the margin of victory, party similarity, and the share of the population with less than complete primary education have negative effects. Finally, the effective number of parties, the share of the population employed in the tertiary sector (a proxy for urbanization), and average past turnout do not seem to affect voter participation.
20
The next step of the empirical analysis was to check for problems of multicollinearity by analyzing variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the variables included in the model of 19 Taking into account that Martins and Veiga (2013) found evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between unemployment rates and turnout, we also tried models which included the squared unemployment rate. It was never statistically significant. It is possible that the recent economic crisis, associated with record-high unemployment rates, changed the way in which Portuguese voters react to this variable when deciding whether to vote or not Veiga, 2013, used data until 2005) . 20 Given that several previous studies found that turnout is persistent, we include the average turnout rate in the three previous elections as an explanatory variable. This moving average of past turnout rates represents the structural voter participation in each municipality better than lagged turnout, which may be strongly affected by shocks in turnout specific to the previous election. Nevertheless, this paper's conclusions regarding the effects of term limits on turnout are unchanged if we use lagged turnout instead of average past turnout. The results are not shown here, but are available from the authors upon request. Table 2 , the effect of term limits on turnout seems to go beyond the mere withdrawal of the incumbent mayor (a competition effect). It is also possible that the removal of more than half of the mayors at the same time, and the attention it received from the media, 24 had a considerably greater impact on voters' decisions to participate in the 2013 elections than the somewhat sporadic withdrawals that occurred in previous elections. That, expressive voting and informationbased motives may have played an important role in the 2013 local elections, leading to increased voter participation in the municipalities of term-limited mayors.
A deeper analysis of the data indicates that the percentage of reelection-eligible mayors who did not run was considerably smaller in 2013 (5.5%) than in the previous elections (average of 14.9%). This reduction in voluntary withdrawals may be due to the fact that mayors now know that the limit of three consecutive terms in office will soon be binding, forcing them to step down. But, this implies that the dummy variable Reelection-eligible mayor does not run is endogenous. Besides being affected by the coming into force of binding term limits in 2013, the decision of the incumbent mayors to run or not for reelection may also depend on personal characteristics (e.g., age), on time in office, and on the likelihood of winning the next elections. The latter will be related to control variables, such as the unemployment rate and the margin of victory obtained in the previous election. This potential endogeneity implies that the coefficients of columns 1 and 2 may be biased. To overcome this problem, we estimate a mixed-process model, which combines a probit for Reelection-eligible mayor does not run, with a linear regression In order to account for these cases, we created the categorical variable (ResM A) which takes the value of one for mayors who resigned before the end of their terms, equals two for those that ran for president of the Municipal Assembly, and equals zero otherwise. Then, we extend the model of equation (1) 
(3) 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013 One problem with the estimation of equation (3) The effect when they ran for president of the Municipal Assembly appears to be the same, 27 The interpretation of the estimated coefficients is the following. In the case of our base category (the 19 as the interaction with (ResM A = 2) is not statistically significant. Finally, although the overall effect in the municipalities whose mayors resigned and were replaced by their deputy-mayors appears to be negative (−0.655 = 0.693 − 1.348), a Wald test does not reject the hypothesis that the effect is equal to zero. Table 4 reports the results of the estimation of the models of equation (2) for 2,163 parishes whose territorial boundaries were not altered during the sample period. As for municipalities, we use as dependent variable the voter participation rates in the elections for the Town Council, which are practically equal to those for the other two concurrent local elections (Municipal Assembly and Parish Assembly), with correlation rates of 99.9%.
Results for parishes
The procedure adopted was, again, to start with the estimation of the full model (column 1), exclude the variables with problematic VIFs (column 2), and use the AIC and the BIC to guide the selection of the most appropriate parsimonious model (columns 3-5). true lame ducks and of those who ran in another municipality) ResM A equals zero, and the effect of term limits is given by δ. Statistical significance of κ 1 or κ 2 indicates that the effect for the respective type of mayors is different from that for the base category. For example, the effect for resigning term-limited mayors is δ + κ 1 .
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-continued from previous page - Notes: The estimation method used in each regression is indicated in the title of the respective column.
All models include election dummies, and NUTS III region-specific trends. Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
Marginal effects are reported for the Fractional Probit method. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
21
The results reinforce our conclusion that the introduction of term limits at the local level had a positive effect on voter turnout. The dummy variables for term-limited mayors and parish presidents always have positive and statistically significant coefficients. Since the interaction term is not statistically significant, there is no evidence of a total effect which goes beyond the sum of the individual effects. This sum is between 1.998 and 2.156
percentage points, which implies that voter turnout increased by roughly 3% in parishes that, simultaneously, had a term limited-president and belonged to a municipality with a term-limited mayor.
Regarding the control variables kept in the parsimonious model, the effective number of parties and the presence of independent lists at the parish level are positively related to turnout, while lower levels of education, greater margins of victory and party similarity (at both levels) are negatively associated with turnout. These results are in line with those for municipalities, shown in Table 2 . The main differences are the lack of statistical significance, at the parish level, of unemployment rates, population growth, and of the share of the population that is employed in the tertiary sector. Additionally, the log of population has a problematic VIF, which led to its exclusion from the estimations for parishes.
Although the models of Table 4 include data at both the parish and municipal levels, the estimation methods used do not take the hierarchical structure of the data into account. 28 Thus, they are unable to disentangle the contributions of the hierarchical levels and can lead to biased standard errors, because parishes belonging to the same municipality may share unobserved common factors and thus not be independent.
In order to overcome these potential problems, and as a robustness check, we estimate multilevel mixed-effects linear regression models 29 using parish data. As before, we start 28 Since each parish always belongs to the same municipality, we have a multilevel hierarchical dataset, with parishes in the first level and municipalities in the second. 29 For details on multilevel longitudinal models, see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012) . One drawback of these models is that, like fixed effects, they do not take the bounded nature of the dependent variable into account. Therefore, we face a trade-off. These models deal better than those of Table 4 with the multilevel nature of the data, but deal worse with the boundedness of the dependent variable than 22 with the full model, exclude the variables with high VIFs, and proceed to the selection of the most appropriate parsimonious model. To economize space, only the parsimonious' model estimation results are reported in Table 5 . In column 1, we assume random intercepts at the parish and municipal levels, and in column 2 we additionally assume random slopes for the term limits' dummy variables at the municipal level.
The results reported in Table 5 are very similar to those of Table 4 , and provide further evidence supporting the hypothesis that term limits have positive effects on voter turnout.
Regarding the control variables, the main differences are that the average past vote share of left-wing parties and the share of the population employed in the tertiary sector are now statistically significant, with the expected negative signs. Notes: All models include election dummies and NUTS III region-specific trends.
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robustness tests
Besides estimating the models for municipalities and for parishes with alternative methods, and trying alternative explanatory variables, we checked the robustness of the results in several additional ways. First, we used municipal-specific trends instead of regional trends. Second, we used a single trend for the treated municipalities, instead of regional trends. Third, we restricted the time period to 2001-2013, so that only 21st
Century elections were considered. Fourth, we defined the participation rate using as denominator the population that is at least 15 years old, 30 instead of the number of 30 There is no data available on the population that is 18 years old (the required age to vote) or above.
24 registered voters. The main results remained practically the same and our conclusions regarding the effects of term limits on voter turnout were unchanged (see Tables B.1 
and B.2 in Appendix B).
A final robustness check consisted of a placebo test using only pre-treatment data.
Concretely, we coded the term limit variables as if the mayors and parish presidents that were term-limited in the term leading to the 2013 elections had been term-limited in the term leading to the 2009 elections. As shown in the last row of Tables B.1 and B.2, the dummy variable for a term-limited mayor is never statistically significant. The same applies to the share of term-limited parish presidents in the estimations for municipalities (Table B .1). Although the dummy for a term limited parish president is statistically significant in the placebo test for parishes (Table B. 2), it has a negative sign, the opposite of what we obtained in Tables 4 and 5 . That is, the placebo test shows that the positive effect on turnout in treated municipalities/parishes was not present before treatment (before term limits became binding).
Conclusions
Despite the extensive and fast-growing literature on the determinants of voter turnout (Dhillon and Peralta, 2002; Cancela and Geys, 2016 ) and the considerable number of studies analyzing potential effects of term limits (Mooney, 2009) , only a couple of studies bridge these two topics. To the best of our knowledge, the effects of term limits on voter turnout have only been analyzed for California (Nalder, 2007; Hajnal and Lewis, 2003) .
This paper helps filling this gap in the literature by studying the impact on voter turnout of the recent introduction of term limits at the local government level in Portugal. For that purpose, a difference-in-differences framework is applied to two different panel datasets, spanning the period from 1997 to 2013: one comprising all 308 Portuguese municipalities;
and, another, for 2,163 parishes whose territorial boundaries were unchanged during the sample period.
Contrary to previous findings, which suggest a negative effect (Nalder, 2007) Notes: The estimation method used in each regression is indicated in the title of the respective column. All models include municipal and election fixed effects, and the control variables of the parsimonious models of columns 2-4 of Notes: The estimation method used in each regression is indicated in the title of the respective column. All models include municipal and election fixed effects, and the control variables of the parsimonious models od columns 3-5 of Table 4 . NUTS III region-specific trends are included, except when otherwise indicated. Marginal effects are reported for Fractional Probit and Beta Regression methods. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
